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CASE NOTE
Insurance—McCarran-Ferguson Act—Section 2(b)—Scope of Federal
Regulation of Insurance.—Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. 1—The Republic National Life Insurance Company, a Texas corpora-
tion, and the Hamilton Life Insurance Company of New York, a New York
corporation, were parties to a group reinsurance agreement. Under this agree-
ment, Hamilton assigned to Republic for reinsurance 80 percent of its group
life insurance policies covering civil service employees in the New York City
area. The agreement also contained a broad arbitration clause s Acting pur-
suant to this clause, Hamilton served a demand for arbitration in New York
on Republic. Hamilton claimed it had paid certain claims assigned to and
accepted by Republic and that, under their agreement, Republic owed
Hamilton $278,023.41. Four months later Hamilton appointed an arbitrator
but Republic refused to proceed to arbitration. Instead, it "subjected Hamilton
to a barrage of court proceedings in an effort to obtain judicial relief." 3 During
this "barrage," which lasted nearly eight months, Hamilton filed a petition
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.4
Republic argued that the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable in this
dispute because Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 5 (McCarran
Act) prevented its application. Section 2 (b) provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance... .
Republic argued that this section exempts the insurance business from all
federal statutes which do not specifically state that they are applicable to
insurance. Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act, with no specific reference to
insurance, would be inapplicable to the dispute and the court would lack
jurisdiction over the subject matter since the suit was based on the Act.
On the other hand, Hamilton argued that Section 2(b) of the McCarran
Act did not prevent the Arbitration Act from applying in this case. Hamil-
ton's position was that under section 2(b) the court should determine whether
a general° federal statute, such as the Federal Arbitration Act, invalidates,
I 291 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2 The arbitration clause provided, inter alia, that "all disputes and differences between
the two contracting parties upon which an amicable understanding cannot be reached
are to be decided by arbitration" and that "the arbitrators shall place a liberal construction
upon this agreement, free from legal technicalities, for the purpose of carrying out its
evident intent." Id. at 227.
3 Id. at 228.
4 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964).
6 The word "general" is used throughout this note to identify those federal or
state statutes which may affect the insurance business, but which are not specifically
enacted to regulate insurance. "General" statutes should be distinguished from "affirma-
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impairs or supersedes any state law designed to regulate the insurance busi-
ness. If the court found no such state law, the general federal statute would
not be rendered inapplicable by the McCarran Act even though the federal
statute conflicted with a general state law. Thus, since the Federal Arbitration
Act does not invalidate, impair or supersede any state law enacted for the
purpose of regulating insurance, the Act would be applicable to the dispute.
Thus the principal issue in the case was whether Section 2 (b) of the
McCarran Act renders general federal statutes, such as the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, inapplicable to the insurance business. The court HELD: The Mc-
Carran Act does not preclude the application of federal statutes which do not
specifically apply to the business of insurance unless the pertinent state laws
to be invalidated, impaired or superseded by the federal statutes were enacted
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. 8 The court reached
its conclusion by examination of the language and legislative history of the
McCarran Act.
After determining that the Federal Arbitration Act is not specifically
directed at insurance, the court considered whether there was an applicable
state statute with the purpose to regulate insurance. The Hamilton court in-
spected the relevant statutes of both Texas and New York, and decided that
neither was designed to regulate insurance. As a result, the two statutes were
considered to be outside the protection of section 2 (b). Thus they did not
preclude the application of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The McCarran Act was the result of a troublesome interrelationship
among insurance, state regulation of insurance and the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution. In Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that issuance
of an insurance policy was not commerce.° Thus the states were assured that
they had the exclusive right to regulate insurance 1 0 However, in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 11 insurance transactions became subject
to federal laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. This decision cast
the insurance business into a state of legal turmoil, as the insurance com-
panies feared antitrust prosecution and the state governments feared loss of
tax revenue under their existing laws." In addition, the states were con-
fused as to what type of new legislation they could enact without violation of
the Commerce Clause." Thus, pressure grew for Congress to clarify the state
of the law. The result was the passage of the McCarran Act in 1945. 14
tive" statutes which refer to federal or state statutes specifically designed to regulate
insurance.
7 Two other issues emerged in the district court. They were, however, procedural
in nature. One concerned the proper service upon Republic and the other a question of
joinder of a third indispensable party.
8 With respect to the other two issues, the court held that proper service was given
to Republic because Republic, by agreeing to arbitrate in New York, consented to the
court's jurisdiction to compel arbitration; and that there was no unjoined indispensable
party.
9 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
10 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969).
11 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
12 3 Rutgers L.J. 95, 95-96 (1949).
13 Id. at 96.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
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The court considered the language of the McCarran Act as unambiguous
and concluded that Section 2 (b) of the Act does not preclude the application
of general federal statutes unless the conflicting state laws were enacted for
the purpose of regulating insurance." In other words, the general federal
statutes apply if the pertinent state statutes are not designed to regulate the
business of insurance. This is the correct statutory interpretation because the
Act is expressly concerned with the relationship between acts of Congress and
state laws "enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."
Without such state statutes there is no relationship which the Act is to govern.
This conclusion is also clear from the purpose of the Act. The purpose of the
McCarran Act is to reaffirm the states' power to regulate insurance." This
policy seems to require that the state regulation be specifically designed for
insurance. Otherwise the Act would have the effect of destroying federal rights,
such as those created by the Federal Arbitration Act, simply because the sub-
ject of the agreement was insurance. There is no evidence that the McCarran
Act was intended to have such an effect. Moreover, even cases that do not re-
quire elaborate manifestations of the purpose to regulate insurance in state
statutes in order to find a protected regulation of insurance give no indication
that they would also include, within the Act's protection, statutes not designed
to regulate the business of insurance."
The Hamilton court also concluded that the purpose of the McCarran
Act was to reaffirm the power of the states to regulate insurance despite the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision making insurance subject to commerce
clause enactments." Although the court considered the states' power to regu-
late insurance as remaining subject to constitutional limitations," it con-
cluded that state statutes intending to regulate the business of insurance
could not be overridden except by specific congressional enactments. 20 This
interpretation seems reasonable and correct in light of the legislative history
of the bill and the relevant case law. For example, the House Report on the
bill recognized the problems which arose after the South-Eastern Underwriters
case and clearly indicated that insurance regulation should be continued by
the states subject to the constitutional limitations expressed by the Supreme
Court. 21 In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n22 the Supreme Court stated that
the major purpose of the McCarran Act was to dispel the doubts raised by the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision with respect to the continuing power of
the states to regulate insurance.
15 291 F. Supp. at 230.
16 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
671-72.
11 E.g., California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (where the court considered a general authorization
of conduct as protected state regulation of insurance since the state statute was in the
California Insurance Code). See also FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
15 291 F. Supp. 230.
15 Id. at 229.
20 Id. at 230.
21 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1954), U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
671-72.
22 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1960).
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However, the Hamilton court found no legislative history indicating that
the intent of the McCarran Act was to make general federal laws inapplicable
to the insurance business even where the conflicting state statutes were not
aimed at regulating the business of insurance. 23 To buttress this conclusion,
the court relied upon two cases where federal law was held to apply despite
a conflicting state statute designed to regulate insurance.
In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing 24 a ship collided with a pier and caused
several drownings. Under Louisiana law, the representatives of the deceased
men could sue the insurer of the owner of the vessel separately. But under the
Federal Limitation Ace all claims against a shipowner could be consolidated
in admiralty in order to limit the owner's liability, at least in some circum-
stances, to the value of his interest in the vessel and its cargo. The representa-
tives of the deceased brought separate suits in the state courts against the
insurer of the owner, but the shipowner filed a consolidation petition in admi-
ralty in the federal district court to limit his liability. The Supreme Court found
a clash between the Louisiana direct action statute and the federal maritime
law because the local law would splinter the claims by permitting each party
to sue the insurance company while the federal law allowed consolidation of
all claims to limit the shipowner's liability." The Court found that the ex-
clusive purpose of the McCarran Act was to offset the adverse effects on
state regulation of insurance caused by the decision in South-Eastern Under-
writers.27 Since South-Eastern Underwriters dealt with the clash between state
regulation of insurance and interstate commerce and since the clash in Mary-
land Casualty was between state regulation of insurance and maritime law,
the Court held that the McCarran Act was not relevant and allowed the con-
solidation under the Federal Limitation Act.23 Thus, even though the state
had specifically regulated insurance, the Court refused to apply the state
law in place of the federal law.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co 2 9 involved an action for
trademark infringement and alleged unfair competition under the Lanham
Act." The state law gave the state Board of Insurance Commissioners the
power to consent to the names of insurance companies, and the defendant ob-
tained such consent. However, when the plaintiff, Sears, filed suit, the court,
despite the state insurance regulation, viewed the matter under the trademark
protection afforded by the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the McCar-
ran Act does not limit the right of the owner of a trade or service to sue in
the federal courts merely because one of the duties of the state board is to
approve the name of the infringing insurance company. 3 ' Following the ap-
proach used in Maryland Casualty, the court determined that the purpose of
the McCarran Act was to resolve the problems caused by the South-Eastern
23 291 F. Supp. at 230.
24 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
25 46 U.S.C. §1 183, 186 (1964).
20 347 U.S. at 415.
27 Id. at 413.
28 Id.
20 246 F.2d 161 (5th Or. 1957).
30 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1964).
31 246 F.2d at 172.
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Underwriters decision and therefore that no legislative intent existed to limit
the application of the Lanham Act. 32
Both Maryland Casualty and Sears, Roebuck indicate the reluctance of
courts to hold general federal statutes inapplicable even where there is an
applicable state statute designed to regulate insurance. The courts appear to
start from the premise that the federal law applies and then interpret the
limitations of the McCarran Act very narrowly. The only decision appearing
to sustain the contention that under the McCarran Act general federal laws
should not apply, even where the applicable state statutes were not enacted for
the purpose of regulating insurance, is the court of appeals decision in SEC
v. National Sec., Inc. 33 However, this decision was later reversed by the
Supreme Court.34
In National, the SEC sought to invalidate a merger of two stock life in-
surance companies on the grounds of misrepresentation in the proxy state-
ment. The merger agreement had been previously submitted to the Arizona
Director of Insurance and approved by him. Under Arizona law the Director
of Insurance had the power to approve such mergers if he found that the
parties complied with specified statutory criteria. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found the Securities Exchange Act inapplicable under
the McCarran Act because use of the federal act would impair the state law.35
However, in its discussion of the McCarran Act the court employed
language from the Act's legislative history out of proper context and con-
cluded that the statutory intent was to put the business of insurance beyond
all present and future federal legislation not specifically relating to that busi-
ness." The court cited statements to the effect that any federal legislation
which does not specifically relate to the business of insurance will not apply
to insurance. 37 These statements are inapplicable to instances involving a
general federal statute and a pertinent state statute not enacted for the pur-
pose of regulating insurance. Proponents of the Act made such statements
to emphasize the federal power to supersede existing or future state laws spe-
cifically designed to regulate the business of insurance by federal legislation
specifically related to insurance.38 There is no indication that affirmative fed-
eral legislation is needed where there are no such state laws. Any doubt that
the McCarran Act does not render inapplicable general federal statutes where
the pertinent state statutes were not enacted for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance is erased by the Supreme Court's reversal of the
court of appeals in National Securities." There the Court went directly to
the question whether the applicable Arizona statute was enacted for the pur-
32 Id.
33 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967).
34 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969).
35 387 F.2d at 32.
36 Id. at 30.
37 E.g., "If there is on the books of the United States a legislative act which re-
lates to interstate commerce, if the act does not specifically relate to insurance, it would
not apply at the present time." 91 Cong. Rec. 481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson).
38 Id. at 478-88, 1487 (remarks of Sen. Ferguson).
39 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969).
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pose of regulating the business of insurance." It strongly implied that if the
Arizona statute did not have such a purpose, the general federal statute, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, would apply notwithstanding the McCarran
Act. Certainly there would be no need to examine the purpose of the relevant
state law if the McCarran Act precluded all general federal statutes.
The Hamilton holding appears to be correct. The McCarran Act does
not preclude the application of federal statutes not specifically relating to the
insurance business unless the pertinent state laws which they "invalidate,
impair, or supersede" were enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance. The Hamilton decision narrowly applies the McCarran Act and
prevents its use as a barrier to federal regulation of insurance. This interpre-
tation not only enables the states, within certain constitutional limits, to
regulate the business of insurance as little or as much as they desire, but it
also promotes one of the purposes of the McCarran Act—a more adequate
regulation of the insurance business." In the absence of state legislation
regulating insurance, the general federal statutes apply to provide a com-
prehensive and coherent scheme of regulation. Having determined the scope
of the McCarran Act, the Hamilton court found that neither the Texas nor
the New York arbitration statute was enacted for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance. Therefore the McCarran Act did not preclude the
application of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The court first examined the applicable Texas arbitration statute." The
statute judicially enforced arbitration agreements for existing controversies
but it did not enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes." The court
viewed the statute as outside the protection of section 2(b) of the McCarran
Act for two reasons. First, the purpose of the Texas statute was not to regulate
insurance but rather to preserve the jurisdiction of the courts," since at com-
mon law agreements to arbitrate either existing or future disputes were specif-
ically unenforceable in the courts." Thus, the statute was enacted as a general
regulation of arbitration. Second, the court found that "regulating" in section
2 (b) includes only regulation by the state of intrastate activity." The House
Report on the bill specifically declared that states do not have the power to
tax or to regulate insurance contracts entered into outside their jurisdiction??
Because the contract was executed in New York, provided for arbitration in
New York and dealt with New York municipal employees, application of the
42 Id. at 567.
47 H.R. Rep. NO. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
673.
42 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 224-38 (1959).
45 The 1965 revision of the Texas arbitration statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
arts. 224-38 (Pocket Supp. 1968), which allows agreeements to arbitrate all existing and
future disputes except agreements dealing with insurance, was not applicable to the
present dispute because the revision was subsequent to the present arbitration agree-
ment. 291 F. Supp. at 231.
44 291 F. Supp. at 232.
45 Simpson, Specific Enforcernent of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 160,
164 (1934).
46 291 F, Supp. at 232.
47 H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th COng., 1st SS. (1945), U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
672.
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Texas statute would give the statute an extraterritorial effect not contem-
plated as permissible by Congress. Thus, the general nature of the Texas
statute and its extraterritorial effect in this situation indicated that it was not
a state law intended to regulate the insurance business and consequently that
it was not protected by the McCarran Act. Similarly, the court found the New
York arbitration law 48 to be intended for general use, applicable to any dis-
putable subject, and thus not a law protected by section 2 (b). 4° Absent
applicable state law in either state, section 2 (b) did not preclude the applica-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The Hamilton view of the New York and Texas statutes draws support
from the Supreme Court's discussion of "laws regulating the business of in-
surance" in the National Securities case.5° There the Court regarded " [s] tatutes
aimed at protecting or regulating [the relationship between the insurance
company and the policyholder], directly or indirectly," as laws regulating the
business of insurance. 51 More specifically, the court stated that the business
of insurance included "the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability,
interpretation and enforcement." 52 Therefore a law aimed at the interpre-
tation and enforcement of an insurance contract would be a law regulating
the business of insurance because it would be regulating the relationship be-
tween the insurance company and the policyholder.
Although both the New York and the Texas arbitration statutes affect
the interpretation and enforcement of the insurance contract, neither should
be considered as a law regulating the business of insurance. Neither statute
was aimed, directly or indirectly, at the relationship between the insured and
the insurer. The Texas statute was intended to preserve the jurisdiction of the
courts and the New York statute was merely a general arbitration statute.
Thus the court in Hamilton was correct in the holding that neither the Texas
nor the New York arbitration statute was a statute with the purpose of reg-
ulating the business of insurance.
JOHN R. HICINBOTHEM
48 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
49 291 F. Stipp. at 233.
5° 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969).
51 Id. at 569.
52 Id. at 568.
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